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A New Development in Front Group
Strategy: The Social Aspects Public
Relations Organization (SAPRO)
Rachel Pietracatella † and Danielle Brady*†
School of Arts and Humanities, Edith Cowan University, Mt Lawley, WA, Australia
Increased pressure on risk industries to reduce their negative impact on society has
resulted in an increasing volume of “risk” and “responsibility” communications from
interest groups known as Social Aspects Public Relations Organizations (SAPROs).
SAPROs have been criticized for being the “front groups” of risk industries (e.g., the
tobacco, gambling, sugar, and alcohol industries). Operating within the neoliberal policy
framework, SAPROs seek to forestall regulation and prioritize industry profits over public
health. Building on risk industry research from the public health sphere, this article
examines the SAPRO phenomenon and situates it in the political public relations (PR)
literature. Specifically, it considers how SAPROs perform an indirect lobbying function on
behalf of their funding industries. Using DrinkWise as an example of an alcohol SAPRO,
this article shows that SAPROs represent a novel development in front group strategy and
examines how this development intersects with neoliberalism. This article also argues
that SAPROs are deployed by risk industries to hegemonically promote the idea of
personal responsibility and that their indirect lobbying function may be necessary to the
continuance of neoliberal policies.
Keywords: SAPRO, social aspects public relations organization, risk communication, indirect lobbying, critical
PR, alcohol, CSR
INTRODUCTION
Public health advocates have called for urgent research to be undertaken to determine whether the
global alcohol industry is using “front group” and public relations (PR) tactics similar to those used
by the tobacco industry to create a more favorable regulatory and legislative environment at the
expense of public health (Mialon and McCambridge, 2018). The 1998 United States (US) Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) required the release of tobacco and alcohol industry documents.
The ensuing analysis of these documents revealed that when confronted with potential profit
reducing regulation, industry players responded with combative measures, including the use of
front groups, but claimed that the purpose of these measures was Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) (Apollonio and Bero, 2007a,b; McDaniel et al., 2008; Brownell and Warner, 2009).
Organizations that obscure their purpose and/or do not disclose their funding interests
are considered front groups. Fitzpatrick and Palenchar (2006, p.203) defined front groups as
“controversial PR techniques used by organizations to influence public opinion and public policy
on behalf of undisclosed special interests.” This article examines special interest groups openly
funded by the alcohol industry that present their purpose as CSR while promoting the continued
self-regulation of their funding industries. The health literature describes these special interest
groups as Social Aspects Public Relations Organizations (SAPROs) (Babor, 2009; Miller et al., 2011;
Babor and Robaina, 2013; Adams and Livingstone, 2015; Petticrew et al., 2018a,b).
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This article argues that risk industries (e.g., the gambling,
sugar and alcohol industries) use the “third-party technique,”
often credited to Edward Bernays, to disseminate self-interested
messages (Fitzpatrick and Palenchar, 2006). This article also
contends that seemingly independent organizations are being
used to perform an indirect lobbying function on behalf of
their industry funders to influence legislators. To investigate
the relationship between this novel development in PR
and neoliberalism, we define neoliberalism as the practical
implementation of policies that relocate power from political to
economic processes (Thorson, 2010). This rule of the market
champions individual freedom with minimal state intervention
in business and is characterized through privatization, the
deregulation of markets and a shift away from state welfare
provision. We note it can be defined as an ideology as well
this aforementioned loose set of practices that dominate western
normative and practical politics between the state and its
external environment. Using this definition, this article argues
that current neoliberal policies encourage the establishment of
SAPROs and allow their targeted education strategies to triumph
over public health evidence-based and society-wide strategies
that seek to reduce harms. In conjunction with other forms of
corporate political influence, SAPROs reinforce and perpetuate
conditions that allow business and corporations to be most
free of government regulation and are thus championed and
legitimized by politicians with neoliberal ideals. SAPROs are
therefore complementary to neoliberalism, combining in such a
way as to emphasize the qualities of each. SAPROs may even be
necessary to the continued acceptance of neoliberal policies, as
they play a strategic role in managing public perceptions of social
problems by playing into and valorizing notions of individual
freedom and choice.
SAPROs present themselves as independent and benevolent
organizations that are concerned with the mitigation of negative
social aspects of potentially harmful products. However, despite
their benevolent exterior, they should be viewed negatively, as a
corporate PR strategy to block meaningful harm minimization
campaigns (Anderson, 2004; Miller et al., 2009; Adams and
Livingstone, 2015; Cowlishaw and Thomas, 2018; Petticrew et al.,
2018b). The presence of gambling SAPROs is not yet strong
(Adams, 2016, p. 99; Adams and Livingstone, 2015); however,
alcohol SAPROs have been gaining increasing prominence
since the 1980s. Unlike other third-party industry groups (e.g.,
trade associations), SAPROs have greater direct overlap with
public health activities (Babor and Robaina, 2013). SAPROs
were ostensibly created by alcohol companies as CSR vehicles
(Houghton, 1998; Anderson, 2004; Babor and Robaina, 2013).
Anderson (2004) was one of the first researchers to draw
attention to these groups. He referred to them as “social aspects
organisations” and noted that these alcohol industry-funded
organizations focus on drinking patterns rather than volumes
of consumption, describe personal responsibility as a learned
behavior, are involved in policy deliberations, advocate for the
self-regulation of alcohol marketing and comment on the overall
benefits of alcohol consumption to society (Anderson, 2004,
p. 1377).
SAPROs appeared during a period in which competition
had become a normative principle that extended well-beyond
markets of exchange. Domains such as health, education
and scientific research, which were once state directed, had
become subject to market-like processes of evaluation during
the rise of neoliberalism or what Davies (2017, p. 6) calls
“the disenchantment of politics by economics.” According to
Biebricher (2015), the reshaping of structures in response to
the 2007 economic crisis challenged democracy. Biebricher
(2015, p. 257) further contended that neoliberal theory must be
understood as a body of thought that revised and revitalized
elements of the classical liberal agenda in response to perceptions
about the perceived crisis and global governance. Neoliberalism
positions freedom as an overarching social value, rejects industry
regulation and high taxation and posits that public services
should be subjected to market competition. A strong government
is only required to facilitate global commerce, protect private
property through law enforcement and maintain military and
defense services. Due to the reduced role of government, it is
the market that must educate citizens of the potential harms
of products. Walker (2012, p. 561) notes that corporations
can benefit from this transformed institutional environment
by taking a proactive role in political strategy and initiating
grassroots and constituency building efforts to supplement in-
house public and government affairs operations.
The alcohol (Miller et al., 2011; Avery et al., 2016) and the
gambling industries (Cowlishaw and Thomas, 2018) have vested
interests in SAPROs. Thus, rather than seeking to reduce harms,
critical research suggests that a key goal of these institutions
is to avoid government regulation and ensure the continuance
of industry self-regulation. Further, SAPROs seek to protect the
surplus profits generated by problem and harmful consumption
(Adams and Livingstone, 2015). According to the surplus thesis,
due to the globalization of risk industries, billions of dollars in
surplus industry profits can be allocated to PR strategies and
lobbying efforts. Such surplus profits might not be available
if the risk industries were subject to harm alleviating, society-
wide regulation.
Despite claims that they operate in the public interest and
remain independent of their funders, alcohol SAPROs have been
found to advocate for their funding industries (Carah and van
Horen, 2011; Pietracatella and Brady, 2016; Miller et al., 2018).
The type of pro-consumption lobbying in which SAPROs invest
has also been found to block actual harm reduction (Miller et al.,
2018). The risk industries behind SAPROs deny that SAPROs are
PR organizations and claim that SAPROs perform CSR activities
for their industries and that the resulting reputational benefits
should grant them a seat at the policy table (Miller et al., 2011;
Avery et al., 2016). However, Mialon and McCambridge (2018)
undertook a systematic review of alcohol industry CSR initiatives
and noted that the education and social marketing initiatives had
a number of possible adverse effects on public health.
We view SAPROs as corporate political PR; and not CSR, and
thus situate it in the PR, political communication and political
science literature. Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) call for filling
the gap with theory and research at the convergence of the
three disciplines and draw attention to the relative novelty of
political PR as a research field. This is despite the importance
of political PR itself, and its key concept of persuading
and informing target audiences. More recently, Ingenhoff and
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Marschlich (2019) systematically reviewed corporate diplomacy
and political CSR from journals from the fields of PR, public
diplomacy, general management and business ethics, providing a
foundation for empirical analysis of the political communication
of multinational corporations.
To date, relatively little empirical research has been conducted
on SAPROs. Of the studies conducted, some have focused on
the alcohol SAPRO DrinkWise. However, the results of studies
on SAPROs in other risk industries (e.g., the tobacco industry)
could be applied to the alcohol industry by cross-case logic, as it
is likely that in similar circumstances, other industries would use
similar tactics for similar reasons (Brownell and Warner, 2009;
Adams, 2016). This article contends that while communications
by SAPROs may resemble CSR communications, due to their
funding sources, any such communications comprise corporate
political activities. It is clear that risk industries learn from each
other and often engage the same PR and legal firms to organize
political activities (Apollonio and Bero, 2007a, p. 419).
Using DrinkWise as an example of a SAPRO, this article
begins by examining the intersection of SAPROs with
neoliberalism. It then addresses public health claims that
SAPROs are front groups that engage in PR activities on
behalf of risk industries. This critical examination of the
establishment and effects of SAPROs shows that they engage
in two related roles; they indirectly lobby on behalf of their
industries and they disseminate an ideology that supports a
neoliberal policy framework.
SAPROs AND NEOLIBERALISM
CSR: Adopting a Market Approach to Solve
Social Issues
Rather than be subjected to government regulation, industry
prefers to self-regulate or facilitate market solutions to social
issues. In a neoliberal policy environment, a desire by industry
to adopt this approach and an absence of state intervention
creates a vacuum that CSR and CSR-like organizations (e.g.,
SAPROs) seek to fill. Adams (2016, p. 96) argues that risk
industries “have co-opted the language, practices and reputation
of CSR to project an aura of ethical business practice” and that
“CSR has provided a means of holding back health advocacy
‘wolves at the door’ and of maintaining positive engagement
with employees.” Taking a more positive view, Scherer and
Palazzo (2011) argue that in a global economy, organizations and
industries become politicized, often filling a regulatory vacuum
and therefore transcend mainstream perspectives of CSR as
compliance to societal expectations and notions of economic
CSR. They place this political activity under the new rubric of
political CSR that can see firms engage in activities once provided
by the state, including public health activities.
The argument that CSR is complimentary to neoliberalism is
not new (Kinderman, 2011). In a neoliberal policy framework,
to ensure that every aspect of society conforms to the dictates of
the marketplace, public health communication is commodified.
Despite research and commentary that contends that SAPROs
do not perform substantive harm reduction activities, new
research on the CSR activities of alcohol companies has shown
that <2% of the CSR activities conducted in Europe have
produced positive health effects and that while the efforts of
these companies are unlikely to contribute to the targets of the
World Health Organization (WHO), they “may have a public-
relations advantage for the alcohol industry” (Babor et al., 2018,
p. 8). In an attempt to explain the rise of CSR, Kinderman
(2015, p. 109) used Grayson and Nelson’s definition of these
particular special interest groups to underscore what he terms
“national CSR” for national level business-led non-government
organizations (i.e., coalitions that “carry the moniker” of CSR).
Kinderman found that, while correlating with neoliberalism, CSR
was not coterminous with globalization (Kinderman, 2015) and
described it as a collaborative action that has been raised to meet
broader business and societal needs.
SAPROs can be viewed as a manifestation of a market
approach to solving social issues and are presented as such by
the organizations themselves. When normal market processes
do not solve social problems, “a facilitated market solution, a
deliberate assembly of stakeholders led by a private professional
organization to solve a specific social problem,” can be mobilized
(Williams and Perraut, 2008, p. 4). Governments themselves
may even “turn to” private mediators for solutions to societal
problems, as these types of intermediary organizations are viewed
as progressive innovation providers that are unbounded by
“sometimes outdated” apparatus of the government (Williams
and Perraut, 2008, p. 5).
The potential CSR contributions of non-risk industries should
be acknowledged in circumstances in which no significant
conflicts of interest exist between profits and public interest.
However, the concept of CSR continues to be problematic
due to the lack of a shared definition and, as L’Etang
(1994) has noted, CSR has become a PR tool. Public health
perceives alcohol industry CSR activities as largely instrumental
and/or political (Mialon and McCambridge, 2018). Mialon
and McCambridge (2018) adopted Garriga and Mele’s (2004)
definition of instrumental CSR, which states that instrumental
CSR is used to advance economic objectives. Conversely, political
CSR is used to influence policy and extend power within society.
SAPROs represent what Grayson and Nelson (2013) have termed
“business-led corporate responsibility coalitions.”
In summary, four main issues underscore public health fears
about the adoption of a market approach to alcohol CSR: (1) that
the alcohol industry’s facilitated CSR attempts fall short of the
WHO’s call for CSR that has been proven to be effective; (2) that
CSR attempts could have negative effects; (3) that a common-
sense conflict of interest exists between profits and public interest;
and (4) that the marketing of the industry is self-regulated.
DrinkWise: Adopting a Market Approach to
Reduce Alcohol-Related Harms in Australia
DrinkWise, an Australian alcohol SAPRO, has adopted a
facilitated market solution to address the harms associated with
alcohol. The establishment of such new governance structures
shows the relevance of the neoliberal context. Following
sustained negative media coverage of the societal impact of
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alcohol-related harms, in neoliberal deference to the market,
the Australian Government matched the alcohol industry’s
contribution of $5 million to establish DrinkWise in 2005 (Hall
and Room, 2006). Viewed with skepticism by public health
researchers, particularly in relation to its claim to be independent,
the establishment of DrinkWise was as much a political move
to show the industry’s ability to provide a market solution to a
social issue than a move to reduce real harms. The cash subsidy
is evidence of an interventionist state working to prevent the
regulation of markets.
After the launch of DrinkWise’s first PR campaign, several
DrinkWise executives were quoted in the media, suggesting that
the organization was adopting a market approach to solve a
social problem. Chris Watters, the Chief Executive Officer of
DrinkWise at the time, argued against the society-wide approach
that had been suggested to address the issue and voiced his
opposition to any “fiddling with [the] alcohol tax” (Sweet, 2009).
Noel Turnbull, the then DrinkWise Director and a former
director of one of Australia’s largest PR companies, Turnbull
Fox Phillips, criticized government/state approaches to harm
reduction and contended that a market approach should be
adopted to solve the issue in several public texts (Kerr, 2009;
Miller, 2009; Turnbull, 2014). In a national newspaper article,
Turnbull stated that adopting a market approach to address this
social issue would be better than the government’s approach for
two reasons (Kerr, 2009). First, Turnbull contended that a market
approach should be adopted on the grounds of efficiency. This
argument reflects the neoliberal position that state interference
creates stagnation, waste and inefficiency. Second, Turnbull
contended that the market (i.e., DrinkWise) is better equipped to
solve this social issue due to the short sightedness of governments
and electoral cycles. He criticized the government’s inclination
to direct social marketing to the wrong targets, stating: “There
are alternatives available which treat people as citizens capable
of changing behavior without draconian regulation and punitive
taxation” (Kerr, 2009: para 5). Turnbull further contended
that a market approach would protect the freedom of the
individual. Neoliberal thinking relies on the “assumption that
individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market
and trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 7). Turnbull veered toward market
fundamentalism, arguing that because of its need for legitimacy,
industry is better positioned than the government to genuinely
eliminate alcohol problems, as industry can adopt a long-term
social marketing approach.
Unlike the government, SAPROS are limited to the
dissemination of rhetoric, as they have no powers of enforcement.
SAPROs disseminate responsibility communications that reduce
the legitimacy gap between CSR claims and the actual outcomes
to which Turnbull refers. When the legitimacy of a company (or
industry in this case) is challenged and it fails to instrumentally
adapt to the prevailing notions of legitimacy, other options in
closing this gap fall to PR efforts. According to Dowling and
Pfeffer (1975) communication options can either (1) alter that
definition of social legitimacy or (2) use communication to
“become identified with symbols values or institutions which
have a strong base of legitimacy” (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975,
p. 127). Interestingly, SAPROs are positioned to reduce the gap
between claims of the benefits of neoliberal practices and the
actual results of the practices. For neoliberal political practices to
continue to be used to pursue certain interests, the gap must (at
least rhetorically) be filled.
The United Kingdom (UK) alcohol SAPRO, DrinkAware, was
established in 2006 following a memorandum of understanding
between the Portman Group of alcohol producers and various
UK government agencies (McCambridge et al., 2014, p. 519). Like
DrinkWise in Australia, DrinkAware UK is funded by alcohol
companies but run by a board comprised of industry, public
health and community directors. McCambridge et al. (2014)
compared DrinkWise and DrinkAware, citing them as examples
of alcohol SAPROs that have been established as a market
approach to reduce harms and noting the recent proliferation
of such organizations. The practices and effects of SAPROs
are considered in the following section. Specifically, the next
section examines how SAPROs operate in an environment which
foregrounds neoliberal notions of the state and its relation
to the external environment. The analysis shows that due to
a sleight of hand and the reframing of the issue, political
elites are being presented with limited and alternate sets of
data in the form of information subsidies, which they are
asked to use to assess both the issues and CSR efforts of the
funding industries.
The Role of SAPROs in Neoliberalism:
Valorising Notions of Individual Choice,
Freedom, Choice and Economic Values
Globally, risk industries invest significant resources in the
cultural production of responsibility communications that define
freedom as being in the public interest. Harvey (2005) argues
that the triumph of neoliberalism has been to capture the
ideals of individual freedom and turn them against intervention
and regulation by the state. Certainly, the neoliberal ideals
propagated in the responsibility communications of SAPROs
that valorise individual freedoms and personal choice “appeal to
anyone who values the ability to make decisions for themselves”
(Harvey, 2005, p. 5). This triumph “had to be backed up by
a practical strategy that emphasized the liberty of consumer
choice, not only with respect to particular products but also
with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression and a wide
range of cultural practices” (Harvey, 2005, p. 42). Individual
choice is the most frequently invoked determinant of risk by
SAPROs that ignore the influence of global marketing. In the
case of DrinkWise, individual choice extends to family choice,
that parents choose the behaviors that will determine their
children’s drinking (Pietracatella and Brady, 2016). Rather than
the state providing social protection, under the economic values
of neoliberalism, social protection is a commodity that can be
bought and sold on themarket and it is themarket that is better at
providing protection. Thus, individual security becomes a matter
of individual choice (Harvey, 2005, p. 168).
Personal responsibility underpins neoliberal political practice.
Risk industries that focus on individual responsibility in their
risk communications treat the choice to purchase a risk product
as no different to any other purchase. The common “drink
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responsibly” and “gamble responsibly” slogans imply that any
decision to drink or gamble irresponsibly is entirely the choice
of the individual. This personal responsibility fits neatly into
the neoliberal framework, as it is portrayed as freedom from
intervention. The discourse that freedom from state intervention
(i.e., negative freedom) is more important than personal freedom
from avoidable risk (i.e., positive freedom) has become the
dominant discourse, particularly in affluent countries, such as
Australia and the UK. The discourse is not limited to alcohol and
other risk industries and reflects the developed world’s position
on individual choice. According to the UK Prime Minister
Tony Blair in 2006, many supposed public health problems
are individual lifestyle choices: “These are not epidemics in
the epidemiological sense—they are the result of millions of
individual decisions, at millions of points in time” (Glasgow
and Schrecker, 2015, p. 282). Ward (2009) notes that when
asked about regulating the provision of fast food to children,
former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who was then
the Federal Minister for Health, stated “that the only people
responsible for putting food in the mouths of children were
the children and their parents” (Ward, 2009, p. 3). Like his UK
counterpart, Blair, Abbott’s statement shows that he follows “the
neo-liberalist line of decreasing the regulatory powers of the State
and increasing the responsibility of citizens” (Ward, 2009, p. 4).
Shifting the responsibility to the individual and targeting
young people and their parents is a strategy that has been
employed by alcohol SAPROs more generally (Mialon and
McCambridge, 2018, p. 666). If the responsibility for young
people’s drinking is deemed to lie with parents, then any
regulation that might interrupt the freedoms of other adults
is unnecessary. By targeting a segment of the market, the case
for society-wide control is undermined. Thus, the continual
repetition of a framework under which youth drinking is a
problem feeds into a hegemonic acceptance of a free market
for alcohol. The existence of the youth drinking problem is
not refuted, neither is the need for education, but alcohol-
related harms are known to be present across age groups
(Babor et al., 2010).
Room (2011) argues that when applied, neoliberal ideals,
including consumer sovereignty, increase alcohol consumption
and that modern societies rely on sobriety. According to Room
(2011, p. 141), “The ideological solution to this societal dilemma
is to individualize the responsibility for handling it, apotheosizing
the ideal of the moderate drinker, at the cultural level as a
dream to reach for and at the individual level as an ideal
of a secular pilgrim’s progress.” Under neoliberal conditions,
individual consumers have greater agency and increased self-
reliance in managing their own well-being as the state reduces
their services (Ward, 2009).
The cultural production of pro-consumption responsibility
communications that valorize neoliberal values by SAPROs
represents a practical strategy in action. Confidential alcohol
industry documents were released when Philip Morris was
ordered to make tobacco documents publicly available under
the US MSA (Bond et al., 2010). The documents revealed that
the tobacco and alcohol industries adopted similar strategies
to “develop and provide potentially counterproductive public
education campaigns so as to appear socially responsible and in
an effort to deflect tighter controls on product” (Bond et al., 2010,
p. 329). One key area of concern considered in the documents
was the future possibility of increased taxation and government
regulation (Ward, 2009). Numerous strategies were proposed
to prevent increased taxation with the ultimate and cumulative
effect of increasing the responsibility of individuals for their
alcohol consumption and any related affects (Ward, 2009).
If problems generated by risk industries must be solved
primarily by the market and with minimal regulation, then
problems such as dependency, chronic disease and lowered
productivity become family burdens. Davies (2017) has shown
that competition exerts a moral force by normalizing the idea
of both winners and losers. In a neoliberal environment, those
suffering harms from risk industries are the natural losers
in a rational system. Through the consumption of dominant
cultural texts and the assimilation of frameworks disseminated
by SAPROs, citizens implicitly consent to risk industry harm;
however, this is a fair outcome of competition. This construction
of consent based on the discourse of freedom camouflages an
increasing disparity (Harvey, 2005).
THE OPERATION OF SAPROs IN A
NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENT
Indirect Lobbying via the Dissemination of
Indirect Information Subsidies
Having considered the establishment of SAPROs as a market
approach to solve the harms associated with risk products and
the role of SAPROs in valorizing freedom in an environment
conducive to neoliberal ideals, this article now examines the
mechanics affecting this process. Risk industries influence policy
makers indirectly through various intermediary organizations.
Such organizations act with varying degrees of self-interest,
which they may or may not state. For example, in representative
peak bodies and trade associations, policy actors are cognizant
that they advocate for funding industries or subscribers. When
an interest group provides information subsidies to policy
actors on behalf of another organization, these information
subsidies are equivalent to Gandy’s (1982) concept of indirect
information subsidies.
The provision of indirect information subsidies functions
as an indirect form of lobbying. Indirect lobbying is mostly
informational and usually involves supplying information to
policy actors who are also influenced indirectly by the
mobilization of public opinion. According to this conception of
indirect lobbying, themedia relations of grassroots organizations,
real or fake, can be used as a PR tool to indirectly influence policy
actors. However, conceptions of indirect lobbying are changing.
Trapp and Laursen (2017, p. 143) found that influencing
the public as actors in the policy process through direct
communications may not be the goal of grassroots strategies as
was once thought. Given the increasingmedicalization of politics,
policy makers as media consumers are the probable targets of
politically motivated media communications. Walker (2012, p.
561) hypothesizes that organizations with heavy public presences
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and those concerned with negative public impacts will seek to
influence the public to achieve the legitimation to operate. He
states: “in such cases, lobbying itself is a PR strategy directed
both at the public and at legislators and government agencies”
(Walker, 2012; p. 567).
Gandy’s (1982) concept of information subsidies is useful
in understanding how interest group lobbying occurs and how
communications by SAPROs can be considered a form of indirect
lobbying. Information subsidies reduce the cost of gathering
and processing the information that decision makers in the
policy system use to develop the policies that will benefit their
individual (or sometimes group) welfare. Indirect information
subsidies are delivered to other participants or policy actors in the
policy process via news reports, scientific publications, legislative
investigations and court testimonies, all of which are perceived
to be relatively objective channels of influence (Gandy, 1992).
The delivery of information subsidies coupled with framing are
components of the media relations process of agenda building.
These powerful tools can be accessed in a diversified and
modern media environment. The view taken in this article is that
controlling the information environment is central to achieving
the political objectives of risk industries. Somewhat removed
from their funders by their independent structures, SAPROs
such as DrinkWise provide a convenient means for presenting
politically expedient information. Information is presented to
policy actors on behalf of risk industries, which are viewed as
low-credibility sources of health information, in the form of
information subsidies.
Two extant studies on alcohol SAPROs (Carah and van
Horen, 2011; Pietracatella and Brady, 2016) used DrinkWise
media releases as data to analyse the media relations activities
of DrinkWise as a form of indirect lobbying. Carah and van
Horen (2011) also analyzed the newspaper stories generated by
the media releases. The research showed that the “cherry picking”
of information or the emphasizing of certain characteristics
at the expense of others helps to define and frame issues to
suit organizational agendas. Carah and van Horen (2011) also
found that despite findings fromDrinkWise’s own commissioned
research that implicated the alcohol industry in constructing
and reinforcing the drinking culture, their information subsidies
failed to address this and instead promoted drinking culture
aspects that aligned with the framework they presented.
DrinkWise has sponsored attitudinal and academic research
that subsidized political decision makers, who may not have had
the resources to conduct their own research. Doing so, allows
DrinkWise to select and contextualize the information gathered
to benefit the organization and its funders (Pietracatella and
Brady, 2016, p. 63). DrinkWise framed issues of alcohol harm
as a cultural problem and portrayed drinkers as young (Carah
and van Horen, 2011). DrinkWise expressed a judgement that
drinking was learned from parents and offered its organization
as a solution for developing a better drinking culture via the
education of parents. Pietracatella and Brady (2016) also found
that the DrinkWise media relations discourse promoted targeted
solutions by the separation of the population into responsible and
irresponsible drinkers. Newspaper reports considered DrinkWise
to be a legitimate contributor to the debate; however, criticisms by
health researchers appear not to have destabilized the DrinkWise
frame or the organization (Carah and van Horen, 2011). It is
this sustained and targeted framing by SAPROs that indirectly
influences populations and policy actors who, upon receiving
these indirect information subsidies and feeling sympathetic
to DrinkWises’s framing of the problem, would find it hard
to support society-wide legislation that unfairly discriminates
against responsible drinkers.
Both studies showed that DrinkWise frames issues to create
a favorable agenda for the alcohol industry. Pietracatella and
Brady (2016) found that the general practice of DrinkWise
media relations was intended to disseminate politically motivated
messages to elite individuals and policy makers due to 60% of the
messages identified in the media release sample being directed
to this stakeholder group (58). This occurred despite parents
being the said targets of the ongoing social marketing campaign
that was conducted during the timeframe of the media release
sample. These findings support those of Trapp and Laursen
(2017) on interest groups that showed that policy makers were
the targets of media relations and not the general public. Carah
and van Horen (2011, p. 10) found evidence of the scope, skill
and resources of DrinkWise media relations by applying their
sophisticated understanding of the news template. It should
be noted that DrinkWise’s media releases form an indirect
information subsidy to journalists and policy makers consuming
media; however, media relations activities formed only a part
of their overall mediated activities. A sustained general public
facing campaign resembling public service announcements
successfully shifted the onus from industry responsibility
to parents as being responsible for their children’s learned
behavior (Pietracatella and Brady, 2016). This approach has
succeeded in holding back threatened government regulation.
Miller et al. (2011) examined submissions concerning alcohol
made to the Australian National Preventative Health Taskforce
(NPHT) discussion paper; Australia, the healthiest country by
2020. All alcohol industry submissions mentioned Drinkwise,
and supported the industry-friendly campaigns carried out by
Drinkwise over recommended regulatory interventions such as
higher taxes on alcohol (Miller et al., 2011).
Filling the Credibility Deficit
The revelation of their vested interest means that alcohol
SAPROs have a credibility deficit that must be managed if
their information subsidies are to retain any value among
their intended recipients (Gandy, 1992). One way of filling
the credibility deficit created by the revelation of its vested
interest is for the alcohol industry to position SAPROs as acting
in the public interest. When expedient, SAPROs go to great
lengths to claim independence from sponsoring industries in
order to project an unbiased public interest role of delivering
responsibility messages and alcohol education. According to
its website (DrinkWise, 2018), DrinkWise is an “independent,
not-for-profit organization” that focuses on bringing about “a
healthier and safer drinking culture in Australia.” SAPROs
have taken full advantage of a climate that demands CSR and
have effectively subverted it to serve their funding interests.
Alternatively, when expedient, SAPROs use the notion of CSR
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to fill the credibility gap that the revelation of their being
industry-funded creates. In Australia, DrinkWise’s public interest
posturing is strengthened by the CSR and philanthropy claims
it makes in its alcohol industry submissions to the government.
Due to the early limited government funding DrinkWise
received, such claims need to be made to show DrinkWise’s
legitimacy and credibility (Miller et al., 2011).
Following the revelation of who funded them, alcohol
SAPROs made a number of claims to fill the resulting credibility
deficit, including that: (1) SAPROs function to perform a public
interest service; (2) SAPROs are independently structured; (3)
the board members of SAPROs comprise individuals of personal
credibility; and (4) SAPROs are endorsed by third parties and
the government (Pietracatella and Brady, 2016). These claims
reflect the credibility-building techniques used by all third-party
organizations and groups with undisclosed funders. Due to the
revelation of industry funding, SAPROs involvement in policy
debates depends on the excessive employment of credibility-
building PR techniques.
The Appearance of Self-Regulation
The revelation that SAPROs are industry funded not only
allows industries to claim CSR, but also grants them the
appearance of functioning as “independent” regulatory bodies.
This provides freedom for both consumers and those in the
industry, as freedom in the neoliberal sense is equated with
an absence of imposed external and authoritarian constraints
on the individual (Ives, 2015). Hawkins and Holden (2014, p.
66) note that SAPROs use “their apparent ability to implement
policy initiatives on behalf of the government, often in place
of mandatory regulation” to position themselves as partners in
the policy process. However, SAPROs create another level of
bureaucracy, and interestingly, alcohol SAPROs mimic the work
of credible government departments.
Former politicians and bureaucrats are often installed as the
chairpersons of SAPROs. In accepting such positions, they not
only convey community and public interest in SAPROs, but
also lend their personal credibility to the organization (Miller
et al., 2011, p. 1561). Governments are not completely impartial
either. As discussed above, the reliance of governments on what
has been termed the “addiction surplus” revenue derived from
tobacco, alcohol and gambling gives them a vested interest in
SAPROs (Adams and Livingstone, 2015; Adams, 2016). SAPRO
boards and management teams may also comprise members who
have previously worked for the government, risk industries and
not-for-profit organizations (e.g., GambleAware in the UK). In
addition to their past and future lobbying use, public figures
in SAPROs provide credibility to the organizations, which
allows them to retain their value. Credibility through third-
party endorsement is paramount to SAPROs. It grants further
opportunities for positive media relations and inflated media
impressions. Both DrinkWise and DrinkAware have received
advertising and PR awards that they have used in further media
communications to legitimize their activities.
The perception of self-regulation and harm minimization on
a global level is the purview of the International Alliance for
Responsible Drinking (IARD). The IARD (formerly known as
the International Center for Alcohol Policies) has been styled
as a shadow WHO unit for alcohol (Babor and Robaina 2013);
however, its funding is considerably superior to that of theWHO.
This international SAPRO focuses on alcohol control policies,
medical research, and alcohol education. By posing as health
organizations, SAPROs can use the full weight of their substantial
budgets to directly challenge public health issues. The conflict of
their vested interest undermines the public good that they claim
to represent and falls short of their CSR claims. SAPROs are a
highly publicized concession made by industry.
SAPROs are positioned to negotiate on behalf of their
risk industries. They produce cultural texts in the form of
media releases and marketing campaigns that may make minor
concessions, but aim to maintain the status quo (e.g., SAPROs
may admit to alcohol-related harms, but they attribute such
harms to personal choices). Even when the long-term effects
of alcohol consumption are acknowledged (e.g., dependency
and chronic disease), the solutions are presented as being the
responsibility of individuals or families and the role of SAPROs
is to empower individuals. The Australian SAPRO DrinkWise
was founded in 2005, the same year as the deregulation of
the labor market and after nearly a decade of conservative
government in Australia (Boucher and Sharpe, 2008). The
development of SAPROs is both a consequence and affirmation
of neoliberalism. The negative aspects of neoliberalism must be
“seen” to be managed to ensure continued public consent to
neoliberal policies. SAPROs perform the necessary inflated PR
activities that seek to achieve this objective on behalf of industries
and governments.
ARE SAPROs A SPECIAL TYPE OF FRONT
GROUP?
To be considered front groups, SAPROs would need to conceal
their funding and or purpose. As SAPROs do not conceal
their industry funding, they do not conform to Fitzpatrick
and Palenchar (2006) definition of a front group as a group
that conceals it’s funding. This also means they have no
fear of being “outed,” as exposure of front group interests
can result in a loss of credibility and effect their ability to
influence on public policy (Bodensteiner, 1997). The only
other way in which SAPROs could be considered front groups
is if they were found to be obscuring their purposes or
intentions, as another definition of a front group is “an
organization that purports to represent one agenda while
in reality it serves some other interest whose sponsorship
is hidden or rarely mentioned” (The Center for Media
and Democracy, 2013: para 1). While their intention and
direction is likely obscured but funding not hidden, SAPROs
present their risk industries as beneficent, knowledgeable and
socially responsible.
Associations, such as the International Public Relations
Association, do not prohibit the use of front groups; however,
deception and deceptive practices are prohibited. Some
practitioners interpret the code of conduct to mean they must
reveal the identity of the organizations they serve only if they
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are asked to do so and not all practitioners are bound to
professional organizations (Fitzpatrick and Palenchar, 2006, p.
221). Due to a perceived conflict of interest, tobacco, alcohol
and gambling producers who are interested in profits and
who wish to avoid inhibitory regulation use front groups to
provide politicians with information subsidies that will help
them to be re-elected. SAPROs use the media to transfer public
opinion research to policy makers, cherry picking polls and
highlighting quotable opinions that journalists cannot ignore;
fulfilling the objectives of political PR, of persuading and
informing audiences.
Policy actors “will invest in the production of influence as
long as the benefits they expect to receive from government
policy exceed the costs of influencing that policy” (Gandy,
1982, p. 49). Savell et al. (2014) found that tobacco industry
groups frequently engage in indirect lobbying that obscures
their interests or their purposes. For example, the Ventilation
Task Force, funded by Phillip Morris, stated that its aim was
to reduce workplace harm from second-hand smoke; however,
its real aim, as revealed by the US MSA documents, was to
delay smoking bans (Adams, 2016). The policy set relied on
the information subsidies provided by these front groups. Front
groups apply controversial PR techniques that work. An outing
of interests clearly identifies front group activities; however,
front groups may adopt sophisticated tactics to obscure their
purpose and thus may not be easily identifiable to the public or
policy makers.
Front groups can be distinguished from other manifestations
of interest groups or intermediaries by their level of transparency
in relation to their interests and purposes. Legitimate grassroots
lobbying groups and issue advocacy campaigns do not engage
in deception (Fitzpatrick and Palenchar, 2006, p. 206). Only
critical appraisal can reveal whether the interests being advanced
by organizations truly respond to societal threats and whether
the CSR and public interest claims made are sincere or tactical.
Current research suggests that SAPROs obscure their purposes
and intentions to protect risk industries from further regulatory
legislation by bolstering their direct lobbying with indirect
lobbying activities (Pietracatella and Brady, 2016). However, it
should be noted that the average consumer responding to the
face value of CSR campaigns disseminated through SAPROs
is unlikely to understand the underlying intention. Campaigns
that conceal their true purpose are “stealth campaigns.” Such
campaigns engage in systematic efforts to deceive individuals by
using carefully chosen names to mask their real interests and
serve a very different agenda to that which they appear to serve
(Pfau et al., 2007, p. 74).
Thus, SAPROs are sophisticated front groups that may
reveal their funding but obscure their intentions and represent
a new development in industry front groups and corporate
political action. Different industries use SAPROs to indirectly
subsidize governments with the information necessary to form
policies in relation to issues arising from the use of their
products that will benefit the industry. They do this by
declaring (rather than concealing) their interests. Surprisingly,
despite the revelation of their interests, such fronts continue
to work. The provision of this type of indirect information
subsidy by SAPROs may be necessary to the perpetuation of
neoliberal policies.
CONCLUSION
Concerns about the communication practices of risk industries
are long standing. Researchers generally refer to such activities
as CSR and have found that the tobacco and alcohol industries
engage in similar activities in an attempt to affect legislation at
the expense of public health. This article sought to highlight a
new development in the strategies of front groups. It showed
that traditional delegitimizing agents or the potential outing of
funding interests have been neutralized by SAPROs’ upfront
pronouncements and their subsequent attributions of those
interests to CSR. The key development in the third-party
technique adopted by SAPROs has been their capacity to
fill the credibility deficit created by revelations about their
funding interests. To continue to engage in indirect lobbying,
SAPROs have to work harder than previous groups to fill
the gap this revelation creates. However, as Adams (2016)
argues, the billions of dollars of surplus profits generated by
problem and harmful consumption provides an ample means
to deploy strategic PR to prevent its loss. If such funding
was not available or at stake, SAPROs may not be considered
viable influence-producing machines that can be employed to
maintain neoliberalism.
This article revealed a research deficit. Specifically, it
showed that further attention needs to be directed toward
the communication of risk industries and their political
PR activities. It also identified a relationship between
neoliberalism and this new development in front group
tactics. Neoliberal ideology enacted by corporations and states
reshapes society around neoliberal ideals. The promotion
and enactment of neoliberal practices provides a sympathetic
policy environment and an increased sensitivity to risk has
contributed to this development in PR tactics. Deregulation
has created a space for industries to respond with CSR.
CSR-like campaigns have spurred an opportunistic shift in
governance from democratic structures to organizations, such
as SAPROs, which have unprecedented power and influence.
SAPROs define public interest in terms of neoliberalism.
The emphasis on personal responsibility, rather than health
consequences ensures that any action they take is benign
and non-invasive. Examples in this article have been drawn
primarily from the alcohol industry; however, SAPROs,
also operate in the tobacco and sugar industries and
attention should be paid to their growing presence in the
gambling industry.
One limitation of this article is that a lack of previous
research made it difficult to draw satisfactory conclusions
about the indirect lobbying activities of risk industries. Future
research should seek to analyse SAPROs empirical content.
Such research could make multiple contributions to the
PR discipline and inform public policy more widely. This
study also raised a number of important ethical issues and
questions about whether normative PR models contribute to
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societal problems. SAPROs flourish in a neoliberal policy
environment. Due to their discursive functions, SAPROs
have been protected from being viewed negatively as front
groups. This growing strand of opaque PR practices (whereby
organizations advocate on behalf of industries with contentious
agendas) has the potential to affect deliberative public debate
and policy decisions. If PR is considered the armor of the
establishment, SAPROs represent an advanced weapon of
risk industries.
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